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Abstract
The current study tested competing predictions regarding the effect of mortality salience on
delay discounting. One prediction, based on evolutionary considerations, was that remind-
ers of death increase the value of the present. Another prediction, based in part on construal
level theory, was that reminders of death increase the value of the future. One-hundred
eighteen participants thought about personal mortality or a control topic and then completed
an inter-temporal choice task pitting the chance to gain $50 now against increasingly attrac-
tive rewards three months later. Consistent with the hypothesis inspired by construal theory,
participants in the mortality salience condition traded $50 now for $66.67 in three months,
whereas participants in the dental pain salience condition required $72.84 in three months
in lieu of $50 now. Thus, participants in the mortality salience condition discounted future
monetary gains less than other participants, suggesting that thoughts of death may increase
the subjective value of the future.
Thinking about Death Reduces Delay Discounting
“carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero”
“Seize the day, trusting tomorrow as little as possible”
Horace (Odes 1.11)
How does awareness of death influence the value one puts on the future? There are two general
possibilities. The opening quotation distillates a common sentiment in western culture: Live
for today. Death is a stark reminder that the future is not guaranteed, so it is reasonable to
believe that thoughts of personal mortality make one even more inclined to value today over
the future. On the other hand, people make plans and strive for goals (including more life) that
can only be met in the future. These future goals help give meaning to the present and can pro-
vide psychological protection against the threat of death. In this sense it seems reasonable to
believe that reminders of personal mortality make the future seem even more valuable—a
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precious commodity in short supply [1]. The current experiment assessed delay discounting to
determine the manner in which reminders of death influence the value of the future.
Delay discounting refers to a present-biased valuation of rewards in which individuals dis-
count the value of future rewards in favor of smaller, more immediately-available rewards.
Delay discounting rates have implications for a wide range of behaviors that pit short-term
gains against long-term investments, including dieting [2], financial planning [3], and invest-
ing in public goods [4]. Understanding the psychological processes that make individuals more
or less present-focused is a crucial step toward solving problems associated with high delay dis-
counting rates. We reasoned that thoughts of death are likely to influence discount rates and
tested two general possibilities. First, thoughts of death may make individuals more future-
focused and thus lead to lower discount rates (i.e., valuing the future). Second, thoughts of
death may make individuals more present-focused and thus produce higher discount rates (i.e.,
valuing the present). Research inspired by terror management theory provides evidence for
both possibilities.
Terror Management Theory
According to terror management theory (TMT) [5, 6]), the uniquely human awareness of
death, combined with the drive for self-preservation, elicits a potentially paralyzing existential
anxiety that influences much of human psychological experience and interpersonal behavior
[5, 6]. Several experiments have supported TMT by finding that manipulations to increase the
salience of death trigger defensive responses aimed at preventing or reducing potential anxiety
[7–10]. Consistent with the hypothesized role of potential anxiety in TMT, individual differ-
ences in anxiety-related traits (e.g., neuroticism) and self-esteem have been found to influence
the use of defensive responses when mortality is salient [11–13]. The two major defenses
against potential death anxiety include bolstering symbolic conceptions of reality that give
order, meaning, and stability to life (i.e., worldview defense), and increased striving to live up
to cultural standards of value and thereby to attain literal immortality (e.g., life after death) or
symbolic immortality (e.g., transcendence of death through one’s achievements or offspring)
[7, 14].
Symbolic immortality is thought to be sought via five types of behavior [15]. One route to
symbolic immortality is through the biological propagation of one’s genetic line, which may
provide a sense that one is connected to the past through one’s parents and to the future
through one’s offspring. A second path involves obtaining symbolic immortality through crea-
tive pursuits. For example, teaching students, publishing papers, and writing books may allow
an academic to feel as though their unique scholarly products will live on after they cease to
exist. A third path is to find a sense of connection to a larger universe, which may help one to
feel as though one is part of something more permanent than the individual self. A fourth
route to symbolic immortality involves the transcendence of the physical self through spiritual
attainments. A fifth route may be to lose oneself in intense experiences. Florian and Mikulincer
[16] found that high levels of self-reported symbolic immortality are inversely related to death
anxiety, and higher self-reported symbolic immorality reduces defensive responses to mortality
salience (e.g., more extreme punishments for moral transgressors). Thus, symbolic immortality
appears to be a key to reducing death anxiety and the aftereffects of mortality salience.
Mortality salience and a focus on the future
Desire for immortality provides a clue to a temporal bias that may emerge in response to
reminders of death—a focus on the future. Insofar as reminders of death engender a focus on
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the future, thinking about death should decrease delay discounting rates as individuals become
more concerned with what the future holds rather than what they may gain right now.
In addition to evidence for increased immortality striving, theory and research on levels of
mental construal also lend indirect support to the idea that mortality salience increases future-
oriented concerns. According to construal level theory [17], hypothetical events and future
events (e.g., one’s own eventual death) tend to be construed in abstract or high-level terms.
This is in contrast to recent or actual events (e.g., the experience of dental pain), which tend to
be construed in more concrete, low-level terms [18, 19]. Personal mortality can be seen as a
hypothetical future event that looms as an inevitable reality. Insofar as thinking about death
promotes more abstract or future-oriented mindsets, reminders of death may increase the
value of the future and reduce delay discounting.
Prior evidence supports the assumption that thinking about death promotes abstract, high-
level mindsets associated with an orientation toward the future. For example, Landau, Kosloff,
and Schmeichel [20] found that mortality salience primes increase the tendency to identify
actions at more abstract (versus concrete) levels of identification. More specifically, partici-
pants who had (versus had not) been primed with thoughts of death were more likely to con-
strue the act of voting as participating in democracy rather than as pushing buttons on a
screen. People who endorse abstract action identifications tend to be less impulsive [18, 19],
and experimental manipulations to induce more abstract or high-level construals have been
found to reduce impulsivity and improve self-control [21–23]. Given that mortality primes can
induce more abstract, high-level construals associated with good self-control, thoughts of
death may orient one toward the future and thus reduce delay discounting.
Mortality salience and a focus on the present
The opposite prediction (i.e., that mortality salience increases preferences for smaller, more
immediate rewards) is also plausible and has received support in previous research. For exam-
ple, Gailliot, Schmeichel, and Baumeister [24] found evidence for poorer self-regulation under
mortality salience. Relative to a control condition, contemplating personal mortality caused
worse performance on a variety of cognitive challenges, including a Stroop task and word puz-
zle. Gailliot and colleagues proposed that contemplating death depletes self-regulatory
resources, thereby increasing the influence of short-term desires and undermining long-term
goal pursuits. Other studies have found similar evidence; mortality salience has been observed
to increase risky driving intentions and behaviors [25], gambling [26], and sun tanning [27] for
persons who report these behaviors being particularly relevant to their self-esteem. These stud-
ies bespeak a preference for immediate versus more delayed gratifications particularly when
those gratifications underlie one’s self-esteem.
Evolutionary views of human nature, which include terror management theory, assume the
mind is adaptively rational to the extent that it evolved to solve survival-relevant challenges in
ancestral environments [28, 29]. It may seem rational to favor larger future rewards over
smaller immediate rewards by a simple comparison of magnitudes, but that may not be a deci-
sion the human mind was biologically prepared to make. Ancestral environments were often
unpredictable, lifespans were shorter, and death was an ever-present threat. Forgoing immedi-
ate rewards in such an environment could have carried steep costs. In this view, when death is
salient, favoring smaller, more immediate gains may be the more adaptive choice.
Consistent with this perspective, and using life history theory as a guide, Griskevicius,
Tybur, Delton, and Robertson [30] found evidence that death primes can increase preferences
for smaller, more immediate rewards. More specifically, after reading an article that discussed
violence and death in the 21st century, participants preferred smaller immediate rewards over
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larger, delayed rewards. This pattern was strongest among participants who grew up in
resource-scarce environments, which suggests that persons with relatively fast life history strat-
egies value the present over the future when considering threatening circumstances.
Although the studies by Griskevicius and colleagues examined the effects of death-related
ideation on delay discounting, the current work differs by following research based on terror
management theory to examine the effect of personal morality concerns (rather than broader
societal ones) on delay discounting rates. The current study differed from previous studies in
another crucial respect. Most of the studies reviewed above included a delay period following
the mortality salience induction, because theory and evidence suggest that defensive responses
to reminders of death emerge mainly after participants have had the opportunity to suppress
or minimize death’s salience [31, 32]. But more proximal responses to reminders of death have
been found to emerge immediately after a mortality salience induction. The distinction
between proximal versus distal responses to mortality salience is well established, with immedi-
ate, proximal responses tending to be more rational relative to the more defensive delayed
responses [33, 34]. Vail and colleagues [10] proposed that the proximal response to conscious
death thoughts is to shift the mind away from individualistic, present-focused, status-oriented
goals (e.g., wealth) toward more abstract, communal goals that can help to build stronger com-
munities and interpersonal relationships. Consistent with this view, Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Her-
nandez, and Larrick [35] found that a death reminder had the immediate effect of causing
participants to donate more money to a charity to help the needy in the future compared to the
present.
Because the delay period following mortality salience may involve depleting acts of thought
suppression [24], and because research including a delay period has yielded mixed evidence
relevant to delay discounting, we elected to omit a delay period after the mortality salience
induction in the current study. The absence of a delay period allowed us to investigate the
immediate, proximal effects of death thoughts on valuing the present versus the future, free of
potential confounds from resource depletion. Thus, we asked participants to ponder their own
mortality or a control topic immediately prior to completing a measure of delay discounting.
The Current Study
We identified two competing hypotheses. One is in accord with previous research on terror
management theory and insights from construal level theory and assumes that outcomes that
are congruent with a particular mindset would be valued more than outcomes that are incon-
gruent with a particular mindset. Because future events (such as one’s own death) tend to be
construed in more abstract or high-level terms, a more delayed reward would be congruent
with a high level or abstract mindset. Hence, mortality salience should increase concern for the
future and cause people to value future monetary gains more than they otherwise would. The
other hypothesis accords well with evolutionary psychology, previous research on terror man-
agement theory, and a common sentiment in western culture: Mortality salience should lead
people to “seize the day” and cause them to value future monetary gains less than they other-
wise would. We conducted an experiment to put these hypotheses to the test.
Method
Participants and Procedure
One hundred eighteen undergraduate students (90 women) satisfied a course requirement by
participating. Participants completed the study in a classroom and were randomly assigned to
either a mortality salience or dental pain condition. Participants ages ranged from 18 to 43
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(M = 21.19, SD = 2.88). Participants were predominantly white (80.51%) and non-Hispanic
(88.14%).
Ethics Statement. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at
Texas A&M University. A waiver of informed consent was approved by the IRB because the
study involved no more than minimal risk to participants. Verbal informed consent was
obtained from all participants after they read an information sheet (essentially an informed
consent form that does not ask for a signature). If they consented, they were allowed to partici-
pate. Therefore, their data reflects documentation of their consent.
Statistical power and sample size selection. A recent meta-analysis [9] revealed that the
average mortality salience effect is medium to large in size (r = 0.35) and that the prototypical
mortality salience experiment includes approximately 87 participants (M = 87.3, SD = 50.8).
We elected to collect a larger sample of participants than the average mortality salience study
due to concerns about replicability within psychological science. Sampling 118 participants
afforded us .76 power to detect a medium-sized (r = 0.25) main effect of mortality salience on
delay discounting behavior.
Materials
Mortality Salience. Following previous research [5, 12], participants in themortality
salience condition (N = 60) were prompted to “Please briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of your own death arouse in you” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you
think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.” In the control
condition (N = 58), participants responded to parallel prompts about a painful dental proce-
dure. Immediately following the manipulation participants completed the delay discounting
task.
Delay Discounting. Participants made hypothetical choices pitting an immediate reward
against a delayed but more valuable reward. Specifically, participants made a series of choices
between receiving $50 now versus receiving other dollar values three months later, starting
with $50 and increasing in $5 increments up to $100. The indifference point was the dollar
value at which participants switched from preferring the fixed immediate amount ($50) to pre-
ferring the delayed amount. If the participant never switched, the indifference point was coded
as $105. Thus, $50 now was pitted against increasing possible future rewards. The delay dis-
counting rate was quantified following the recommendations of Weber et al. [36], whereby a
value of 1 indicates no discounting and smaller values indicate greater discounting of future
rewards.
Results
Mortality salience (M = 0.33, SD = 0.28) reduced delay discounting rates compared to dental
pain salience (M = 0.46, SD = 0.26), t (116) = 2.44, p = .02, d = 0.49, 95% CI (.44, 0.53). In mon-
etary terms, the observed indifference points revealed that participants in the mortality salience
condition would trade $50 now for $66.67 in three months, whereas participants in the dental
pain salience condition would give up the same $50 for $72.84 in three months. Put differently,
participants in the mortality salience condition discounted future monetary gains less than did
other participants, suggesting that they valued the future more (S1 File).
Discussion
The current study was the first to ask how contemplating personal mortality affects delay dis-
counting. Consistent with theorizing based upon construal level theory, the results revealed a
greater preference for future rewards (i.e., a decreased discount rate) following mortality
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salience versus dental pain salience. Simply put, mortality concerns appear to cause people to
value the future more.
The results of the current experiment are consistent with prior evidence of proximal
responses to mortality salience. Recall that proximal responses are immediate responses to the
conscious consideration of mortality. Proximal responses, in contrast to more distal responses,
are often rational, future-oriented, and intended to terminate bad habits that may hasten death
[10, 37]. Likewise, the current experiment found that mortality salience had the immediate
effect of causing participants to discount future monetary gains less (value future monetary
gains more), relative to dental pain salience. Given that delay of gratification assists successful
goal pursuit and contributes to several desirable outcomes in life (including higher levels of
educational attainment, income, fidelity, and lower body mass index; e.g., [38]; see also [39]),
the observed evidence for reduced delay discounting rates represents a seemingly rational
response to reminders of death.
As Pyszczynski and colleagues [36] noted, however, thoughts of death are often buried deep
within the mind, away from conscious awareness. Accordingly, most TMT studies have dis-
tracted participants after mortality salience or allowed participants to suppress their death-
related cognitions before assessing the dependent measure of interest. Relative to proximal or
immediate responses to mortality salience, these more distal responses appear irrational and
defensive. For example, out-group derogation, harsh punishments for norm violators, and
impulsive behaviors are established distal responses to mortality salience. The process of sup-
pressing or burying death-related cognitions can deplete cognitive resources, which may help
fuel distal defenses [23, 40]. By avoiding the potentially depleting effects of death-related
thought suppression, the current findings attest to a proximal response to thoughts of death—
increasing the value of future (versus present) monetary gains. Proximal responses to mortality
salience are much less investigated than distal responses in the TMT literature, and the same is
true of the potential positive consequences of mortality salience. By examining an immediate
and positive consequence of mortality salience, the current results help to broaden understand-
ing of mortality salience effects. However, the current research did not assess more delayed or
distal responses to mortality salience, so additional research is needed to determine whether
delay discounting rates are reduced, increased, or stable when thoughts of death have receded
from conscious awareness.
How can people become motivated to eat well, exercise more, and save more money for the
future? Similarly, how can society deal with the obesity epidemic, large scale debt, and climate
change? Terror management and construal level theories may provide a starting point. Vail
and colleagues [10] suggested that when mortality is in focal awareness, more intrinsically
meaningful goals, which tend to be construed in more abstract and future-oriented, become
activated to enable goal pursuits that help to forestall the grim inevitability of death. By con-
trast, more materialistic, extrinsic goals, which tend to be construed as more concrete and pres-
ent-oriented, are avoided or their importance is downplayed when death is in focal awareness.
It may be the case that conscious mortality awareness activates intrinsic goal pursuit and mini-
mizes the importance of extrinsic goals because the future is seen as more valuable. Put differ-
ently, mortality salience may increase the value of the future, which in turn may activate
relatively healthy, future-focused goal pursuits.
Moreover, although death is omnipresent in western cultures, persons in these cultures suf-
fer from a variety of problems associated with high discount rates, including obesity, large scale
debt, and the threat of climate change. How can these troubling patterns persist if, as we have
observed, reminders of death reduce delay discounting? We propose that, although the proxi-
mal response to mortality salience is to care and plan for the future, this tendency fades when
mortality is not at the center of awareness. When death recedes from focus to linger on the
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fringes of awareness, poor self-control and selfish decision making seem to come to the fore
[24].
Terror Management and Life History Theories
Whereas the current experiment found a reduction in delay discounting among persons who
had just pondered their own mortality, previous research inspired by life history theory found
that thoughts of a treacherous, death-laden future led persons lower in SES to increase delay
discounting [30]. How can thoughts of death lead to both more and less delay discounting? We
think one crucial difference between the two findings is that the current experiment tested the
effect of personalmortality on delay discounting, whereas the research based on life history the-
ory focused on the effects of more generalmortality concerns. Although TMT and life history
theory both recognize the importance of mortality concerns in motivating human behavior,
life history theory emphasizes the importance of resource scarcity and other environmental
factors that helped to shape human evolution, whereas TMT focuses on more micro-level
interpersonal and intrapersonal processes.
It may be that the group-level threat of war and death featured in previous research on life
history theory and delay discounting [30] triggered a greater motivation for survival in the
present (hence more discounting) relative to the typical mortality salience induction. Addition-
ally, it could also be the case that the typical mortality salience prime induces a more abstract
or future-oriented mindset relative to the war-based life history prime. Either of these possibili-
ties may account for the apparent differences between the current findings and prior findings
[30]. It is also important to acknowledge that participants in the current study showed reduced
delay discounting under mortality salience, similar to higher SES participants in the study by
Griskevicius and colleagues [30]. We did not assess participants’ SES in the current study.
Future research exploring differential reactions to personal versus societal mortality salience as
well as the role of SES in responses to mortality salience seems warranted.
Limitations and Alternative Explanations
In the current research we used dental pain as a control condition, as is typical in TMT research
[9]. The dental pain control condition is considered a useful comparison for the mortality
salience condition because pain, like death, is an aversive stimulus. Hence, insofar as thinking
about death and thinking about dental pain have different effects, these effects are seemingly
not attributable to pondering an aversive topic. But we did not include a neutral control condi-
tion in the current study—in both the dental pain condition and the mortality salience condi-
tion participants pondered an aversive topic. We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that
pondering dental pain influenced delay discounting. For example, delay discounting may have
been lower in the mortality salience condition than in the dental pain condition because pon-
dering dental pain made persons more present focused. Indeed, some evidence suggests that
the experience of pain may lead persons to focus on the present. Specifically, Bastian and col-
leagues [41] found that the experience of pain led participants to choose delicious desserts over
other, less enticing rewards (e.g., pens). Insofar as desserts are considered immediate rewards,
this evidence suggests that the experience of pain may lead persons to focus on the present or
on more immediate rewards. Whether merely thinking about pain has the same effects as
experiencing pain remains an open question. Nonetheless, future research should explore how
death and pain influence discounting behavior by comparing them both to the effects of pon-
dering a neutral topic.
The current research included one experiment assessing the effect of mortality salience on
delay discounting behavior. This single study suffers from at least two important limitations.
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First, given recent concerns about the replicability of findings in social and personality psychol-
ogy, future experiments should attempt to replicate the current findings. Although the current
study was adequately powered to detect a medium-sized effect of mortality salience, as dis-
cussed above, attempts to replicate the current results will allow researchers to understand the
true size of the effect of morality salience on delay discounting. Second, the current experiment
focused on proximal responses to mortality salience (i.e., responses measured immediately
after the mortality salience induction) and thus cannot speak to the effect of mortality salience
on delay discounting as a distal or delayed response to mortality salience. Would a delay after
the mortality salience induction lead to a focus on the future, a focus on the present, or no
effect at all? As reviewed previously, we suspect that after participants have had the opportunity
to suppress or otherwise push death thoughts out of focal awareness that thinking about death
would lead to a focus on the present. Future research is needed to test this hypothesis.
Where is the “terror” in terror management?
Last, the current findings may have implications for understanding the role of emotions in ter-
ror management. To the surprise of some theorists [42], standard mortality salience inductions
often fail to change participants self-reported emotional states, presumably because death anxi-
eties are suppressed, sublimated, or otherwise defused. But it may be that standard mortality
salience inductions simply do not induce a strong emotional response. Emotional and motiva-
tional systems are strongly tuned to proximal goals and events [43]. Death, by contrast, is a dif-
ficult to comprehend, abstract, and temporally distant future event for most individuals. Thus,
death may prime an abstract, future-oriented mindset that is not conducive to intense emotion,
but is conducive to valuing the future.
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